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MICHAEL BRADLEY,* CINDY A. SCHIPANI,** ANANT K. SUNDARAM,*** AND
JAMES P. WALSH****
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is the culmination of a fouryear project undertaken by the authors to investigate the purposes and accountability of the modern corporation. The project, generously funded by the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, consisted of four phases. The first phase involved
an extensive review of the literature of corporate governance across the fields
of law, economics, finance, and management, with a view toward identifying
unifying themes, common perspectives, and relevant issues. This exercise produced an extensive bibliography of the most important work on corporate governance in each of these four disciplines.
We then sponsored a fourteen-week seminar series at the University of
Michigan Business School in 1997. The intent was to provide a forum for preeminent individuals from the scholarly world and the world of practice to meet
each week to discuss and debate emerging questions abut the purposes and accountability of the firm. Nearly 150 faculty and graduate students from Michigan’s Business and Law Schools attended these seminars. Each session explored the relationships between theory and practice. Taken as a whole, the
series was relentlessly interdisciplinary. We would like to acknowledge the
following people for their contributions to this seminar series:

Copyright  2000 by Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram, and James P. Walsh
This foreword is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/62LCPForewordBradley.
* F.M. Kirby Professor of Investment Banking, Fuqua School of Business and Professor of Law,
Duke University.
** Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Business School.
*** Associate Professor of Finance, Thunderbird, American Graduate School of International
Management.
**** Gerald & Esther Carey Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan Business
School.
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Norman Augustine, Lockheed Martin Corporation
Lawrence Bossidy, AlliedSignal, Inc. (Honeywell)
William Bowen, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
Thomas Dunfee, University of Pennsylvania
Ronald Gilson, Columbia and Stanford Universities
Stephen Handelman, Toronto Star
Henry Hu, University of Texas
William Marohn, Whirlpool Corporation
Ernest Micek, Cargill Corporation
Raymond Miles, University of California, Berkeley
Jim Moody, Federal Bureau of Investigation (retired)
Andrew Moore, Delaware Supreme Court (former Justice)
Pedro Pick, Czech Post and Tonak
C.K. Prahalad, University of Michigan
Louise Shelley, American University
A.A. Sommer, Securities and Exchange Commission (former Commissioner)
Jan Svejnar, University of Michigan
Bruce Thelen, Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen and Freeman
Robert Thompson, Washington University
Noel Tichy, University of Michigan
Michael Useem, University of Pennsylvania
E. Norman Veasey, Delaware Supreme Court
Kenneth West, TIAA-CREF
Gilbert Whitaker, Rice University
Marina N. Whitman, University of Michigan
Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank

After first reading and discussing the broad interdisciplinary governance
literature and then creating and participating in the seminar series, we articulated both the issues and our points of view about them in a series of articles.
The first article in this issue, The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, represents the third phase of our project. We begin the article by identifying five
forces of change that have profound implications for corporate governance in
contemporary society. These forces of change involve the nature of work, the
nature of the capital market, the nature of the product market, the evolution of
organizational forms, and the nature of the regulatory environment. These
changes implicate every corporate constituency. They also challenge the current legal and practical systems for the exercise of power and control in the
conduct of the business corporation.
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Having identified the major forces of change, we turn to an examination of
their implications for corporate governance. We begin our inquiry with a review of the traditional empirical literature that relates different aspects of corporate governance to different measures of corporate performance. We conclude that this cross-sectional approach is of limited value in analyzing the
fundamental changes that we have identified. Much of this literature consists
of so-called event studies, which cannot possibly capture the dynamics of the
corporate governance process, because, by design, they assume that the existing
institutional framework is taken as given. To analyze the implications of these
changes for corporate governance, we turn to the two most popular paradigms
of the public corporation: contractarianism and communitarianism. We describe these two views of the public corporation and examine how each addresses the forces of change we have identified.
We tentatively conclude that in a world of change, the contractarian view
best orients a public policy position toward the large-scale, public corporation.
While we recognize the limitations of the contractarian view (for example,
third-party effects and ill-defined property rights), we believe that allowing individuals to engage freely in mutually beneficial contracting is the most efficient way of adapting to the changes we identified. We spend some time interpreting the debate surrounding the American Law Institute’s Restatement on
Corporate Governance as an attempt by members of the business community
to inject certain communitarian views into an essentially contractarian environment. We note that although the Restatement contains some language that
might be read as an affirmation of the communitarian perspective, the final
document clearly asserts that shareholder-wealth maximization is the primary
purpose of the business corporation, the fundamental tenet of the contractarian
perspective. Finally, we examine governance structures in Japan and Germany
to determine whether these alternative governance systems provide any blueprint for adapting to change. We find that the governance structures of these
two countries are certainly more communitarian than the structure of U.S. corporations. We conclude, however, that this more communitarian perspective
impedes the ability of corporations in these countries to adapt to an everchanging global economy. We provide examples of corporations in these countries that have expanded internationally and, coincidentally, have adopted certain characteristics of the contractarian or Anglo-American model (for example, Siemens, Deutsche Bank, Hoerst, and Daimler-Benz). We also provide
evidence that the governance practices and procedures in these countries are
moving toward an Anglo-American model.
Our conjecture that the world is evolving along the lines of the contractarian model is an important and unique conclusion of our work. Most who have
written on the subject to date have concluded that there is no “optimal” governance structure and that both the Japanese and German systems are sustainable. We disagree. We believe that there is sufficient theory and evidence to
support our assertion that public corporations around the world are moving
toward a more contractarian structure. Moreover, we believe that this move-
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ment is, in large part, a response to the fundamental changes we have identified.
We do not conclude the article in a state of contractarian euphoria, however. We note that institutions should be developed to reduce the two major
defects of a purely contractarian system. First, contracts cannot be written
when property rights are ill-defined or the terms of contract cannot be enforced. Therefore, we call for the establishment of international standards and
rules of law that would facilitate free contracting across borders. Second, we
recognize the potential abuses of third parties and advocate that, whenever
possible, externalities be internalized.
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems represents the fourth and final phase of this project. We are indebted to the Editorial Board for giving us
the opportunity to invite a broader discussion of these issues and ideas. This
issue embodies the three hallmarks of our overall project. First, the authors
represent a broad range of academic disciplines. Second, some articles lead
from a consideration of theory, while others find their rationale in the world of
business or regulatory practice. And, finally, it presents the opportunity to
hear even more debate about these important issues.
In the second article of this issue, entitled Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of Daimler-Benz, Professors Dennis E. Logue and James
K. Seward provide a compelling case study that supports our thesis that many
European corporations are moving away from their communitarian heritage
toward a more contractarian structure. Professors Logue and Seward chronicle
the changes that have occurred during the past decade in the largest industrial
corporation in one of the most communitarian economies in the world: Daimler-Benz—now DaimlerChrysler—of Germany. Burdened by the constraints
imposed by the German system, particularly the required focus on employees
and creditors, Daimler was forced to confront the imperative of remaining
competitive in global product and capital markets in a global industry, the
automotive industry. To convince foreign investors that “it was not simply
raising capital so that it might continue to conform to German corporate governance standards,” the company transformed itself into a company conscious
1
of shareholder value. The first move was to list its shares, actually its American Depository Receipts on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) in 1993.
The listing requirements of the NYSE mandated that the company restate its
financial conditions to comply with the standards of U.S. generally accepted accounting practices (“GAAP”), which are much more exacting than German accounting standards. Subsequently, the company made a series of restructuring
changes, including removing its chief executive officer, selling off unrelated
businesses, reducing the equity ownership of the hausbank, and increasing the
equity ownership of non-German shareholders. Additionally, in bold moves
for any German corporation, it introduced stock and stock options as a part of
1. Dennis E. Logue & James K. Seward, Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of
Daimler-Benz, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 108 (Summer 1999).
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its management compensation structure and tailored the performance evaluation of its divisions to a return-on-equity metric. The transformation into a
more Anglo-American style corporation culminated in Daimler’s merger with
the U.S. automotive firm, Chrysler, and in its name change to
“DaimlerChrysler” in 1998. The authors trace the specifics of these changes
and present empirical evidence showing that they have had a positive effect on
Daimler’s financial performance. The authors conclude by predicting that
Daimler is merely the first of several German firms that will undertake such a
transformation. Moreover, they conclude that “[a]s more German firms follow,
this trend will hasten the demise of the communitarian form of corporate gov2
ernance, at least in Germany.”
A critical aspect in the transformation from a communitarian to a contractarian style of governance is the role of disclosure. In the third article, we learn
that the relatively more communitarian systems of governance, such as those in
Germany and Japan, have disclosure obligations that are substantially more lax
than those in more contractarian systems, such as those in the United States. In
Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, Professor Merritt B. Fox explores the specific facets through which required disclosure affects the governance process. Professor Fox defines required disclosure as “any legal obligation that requires an issuer’s management to provide, on a regular basis,
3
information that it otherwise might not be inclined to provide.” The article
identifies four specific means by which such disclosure helps to ensure better
governance: by assisting shareholders to exercise their voting franchise; by assisting shareholders in their quest to force managers to perform their fiduciary
obligations; by forcing managers “to become more aware of reality”; and, indirectly, by making the firm more transparent so that market-based forces of discipline—the market for corporate control, the market for external financing,
and stock-based compensation plans—can do their work. Professor Fox argues
that required disclosure reduces the deviation between incumbent management
decisionmaking and results that would impel a potential acquirer to maximize
shareholder value. Similarly, required disclosure helps to reduce the disincentive to choose internal over external finance, thereby increasing the disciplinary
role of external capital markets. Finally, he argues that mandatory disclosure
rules in the United States make it easier to monitor corporate officials because
disgruntled stockholders need only demonstrate the absence of disclosure to establish liability without knowing the details of the undisclosed transaction or
transgression.
In the fourth article of this issue, Corporate Governance in a Market with
Morality, Professor Thomas W. Dunfee challenges the contention that the contractarian model of the firm is, or should be, considered superior to a communitarian view. He begins by noting that even in the most contractarian system,
2. Id.
3. Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
113, 114 (Summer 1999).
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“[m]oral desires are embodied in markets.” He presents two intriguing examples. First, he points out that many consumers are willing to pay higher prices
for “morally superior” goods. For example, consumers are willing to pay
higher prices for tuna fish from companies that employ inefficient methods of
fishing in order to protect the welfare of dolphins. Second, he points out that
consumers often boycott the products of companies that are not perceived to
be moral. The boycott of Exxon products in the wake of the Valdez oil spill
can be seen as an example of such a phenomenon. It is undeniable that corporate managers must anticipate and respond to this degree of market morality.
However, Professor Dunfee goes further. In an admittedly normative analysis,
he argues that while maximizing shareholder value is a corporate manager’s
first duty, they must do this within a consistent set of “hypernorms.” Professor
Dunfee offers a detailed set of criteria that could be used to identify hypernorms.
Professor Dunfee’s article can be thought of as an elaboration of the postscript of Milton Friedman’s contractarian view that “a corporate executive . . .
has direct responsibility . . . to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those em5
bodied in ethical custom.” Professor Dunfee offers a normative prescription as
to how to think about the important qualification attached to Friedman’s proclamation. He writes in the tradition of those who argue that individuals, as well
as corporations, have engaged in a grand social contract to interact with one
another in a moral fashion.
Former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, A.A.
Sommer, provides a brief critique of Professor Dunfee’s article. Any disagreement that Mr. Sommer has with Professor Dunfee’s treatise is a matter of
degree rather than of kind. Both recognize that a certain amount of moral behavior is expected, indeed required, on the part of corporate officers and directors. However, unlike Professor Dunfee, Mr. Sommer is unwilling to jeopardize the basic tenets of the contractarian structure by allowing corporate
managers to stray too far from the principle of profit maximization under the
guise of moral purpose or appropriate social behavior.
The contribution by Professor Timothy L. Fort and Mr. James J. Noone,
Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm, is a critique of both our procontractarian stance as well as the more communitarian position taken by Professor Dunfee. The authors cleverly describe both theories as being based on
an unrealistic notion of contracting.
The agency theory of contracting is ultimately unpersuasive because it fails to take
into account adequately the cultural embeddedness of rationality and choice. Agency
contractarians concentrate on a one-sided, dark notion of human nature and do not
4. Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 129, 129 (Summer 1999).
5. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33.

FOREWORD_FMT4.DOC

Page 1: Summer 1999]

03/09/00 11:55 AM

FOREWORD

7

account adequately for the coercion necessary to sustain the choice that supposedly
validates their approach. Similarly, social contractarians provide virtually no account
of human nature and also miss the embeddedness problem. By not fully linking contracts to a transcendent reality, social contractarians provide no real reason to choose
social contracting over agency contracting.6

The authors also quarrel with the basic assumption of both models, an assumption asserting that human behavior is motivated purely by self-interested
desires. In essence, the authors argue that the individual is the inappropriate
unit of analysis. Rather, any theory of social organization must specifically account for the interpersonal relations that occur within groups and institutions.
The authors rely on a “mediating institutions” approach, which locates the importance of these relationships in small groups rather than following the traditional communitarian reliance on large-scale organizations. What emerges
from this critical analysis of the scholarly literature on corporate governance is
what the authors describe as “a constructive model . . . that takes the best features of social contracting and agency contracting and blends them with a natu7
ralist-based communitarianism.”
In the next contribution, Professor Robert M. Thompson examines the encroachment of the federal government into the affairs of public corporations.
Long the province of the various states, recently enacted federal statutes have
shifted the balance of power over corporate governance issues toward Washington D.C. In Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, Professor Thompson argues that
there has been a change in the federal/state law matrix regarding issues of corporate governance as a result of three new statutes regulating securities. These
statutes include the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Before the enactment of these statutes, state
and federal law concerning issues of disclosure generally existed side-by-side.
However, with the enactment of these statutes, Congress set out to preempt
state law in significant respects. The 1996 legislation preempts state law with
respect to registration of securities. The 1998 legislation blocks state law antifraud class actions involving the largest American corporations, with some limited carve-outs preserving state law in certain instances. The 1995 legislation
imported limits on class actions brought under Rule 10b-5.
Professor Thompson concludes that the results have been significant. Corporate governance is now a shared function between state and federal governments. Some shareholder functions are protected by both federal and state
law; some receive protection from one but not the other; and some receive little
protection from either. He finds that if Congress had any real concern about
federalism, it could have preserved the states’ control over shareholder func6. Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate
Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
163, 165 (Summer 1999).
7. Id. at 166.
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tions. He believes that the division between state and federal regulation depends on what Congress wants rather than a determination of which corporate
functions are best served by federal law as opposed to state law. He concludes
that the real focus of the 1998 Act was to prevent alternate state rules that
might be more favorable to shareholders. As a result, we have moved a bit fu rther toward a federal corporate law.
Professor Deborah A. DeMott’s contribution anchors this issue on corporate governance. She identifies an important distinction between British and
American corporate law. As suggested by her title, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’ Self-Interested Transactions, Professor DeMott explains the important role played by so-called disinterested or independent directors in the American system of corporate governance.
Interestingly, there is no role or even such a distinction in the British system.
In the United States, disinterested directors play a pivotal role in monitoring
corporate activity that may be tainted by self-interest. Examples of such activity include determining compensation plans, deciding on control transactions,
or determining whether the firm should take up a derivative stockholder suit.
In contrast, U.K. corporate law prohibits many self-interested transactions outright or requires the assent of shareholders. The United Kingdom may presuppose a greater role for direct monitoring by shareholders, while the United
States has long relied on the judgment and integrity of outside directors, the
figures in the landscape. She ties these distinctions to historical differences in
patterns of shareholdings, as well as to institutional differences, chief among
them the U.S. tradition of mandating disclosure and greater ease with which
problematic transactions may be tested by litigation. Professor DeMott’s
analysis reveals that there are significant differences in the details of what
might be seen as very similar governance structures. She reminds us that the
Anglo-American system of governance embodies some very real Anglo and
American differences. Notwithstanding our impulse to provide robust guidance to a myriad of firms in a wide range of countries, we must be careful about
our generalizations. This wise counsel appropriately concludes this issue of the
journal.

